Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being and Time

Philosophy Today  40:1.  Spring 1996. pp. 36-46.

Yoko Arisaka

Philosophy Department
University of San Francisco
2130 Fulton St.
San Francisco, CA 94117, U.S.A.


 Heidegger's abandonment of his early "foundational" project after the Kehre has often been attributed to a general shift in emphasis away from subjectivity toward a fuller conception of Being.  It has not yet been shown how that shift might be rooted in specific problems within Being and Time itself.  This paper is a critique of Heidegger's "foundational" project in Being and Time.  The problem will be discussed by examining a representative case of a foundational relation--one between space and time. In particular, I will evaluate the claim in Section 70 that Dasein's temporality founds spatiality.  I will show that his argument fails and that Heidegger cannot successfully carry out his project within his phenomenological framework.  This conclusion proves helpful in understanding his later conception of space.

1.  Introduction

One of the crucial moves in Heidegger's project of "fundamental ontology" occurs at the onset of Division Two of Being and Time, where he affirms that the content of the first half of the book--Being-in-the-world--is itself founded on temporality.1  Heideggerian scholars generally agree that Heidegger later abandoned this foundational approach.2  However, a clear account of the reasons for this change of focus is still a matter of dispute.  Was it an external consideration, or was it a tension within the theory itself?

This paper argues that an aspect of the problem that later led Heidegger to abandon the earlier project can be found already within the theoretical framework of Being and Time.  I will highlight the tension by closely evaluating the connection between the first and the second divisions of Being and Time, focusing on a particular foundational relation--that of space and time--which Heidegger discusses explicitly in Section 70.  The space-time relation is chosen as an example, since Heidegger's notion of spatiality is one of the central structural components of Being-in-the-world.  The space-time relation moreover is one which continued to concern Heidegger for the next forty years:  In his 1962 lecture "Time and Being," Heidegger admits that "the attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable" (OTB 23).3  Why did Heidegger change his mind?  A careful analysis of Being and Time will show that to found space in time, Heidegger would have to abandon his whole phenomenological framework.

 The problem can be stated in terms of Heidegger's distinction between what he calls the "equiprimordial" (gleichursprunglich) relation and the "foundational" relation.  These are two alternative ways in which we can think about the relation between space and time.  While Heidegger argues that the space-time relation is foundational, I  argue that it must be considered equiprimordial.4  Let me begin by explaining what Heidegger means by this distinction.

 A.) Equiprimordiality:  If X and Y are equiprimordial, then they are equally basic (primordial) and mutually interdependent.  They pick out different aspects within a unified, integrally connected whole, and one cannot exist without the other.  This is a non-hierarchical relation.  Neither term is more basic than the other.  For Heidegger, since we are mutually interdependent with the others and things with which we interact, Dasein and "world" are equiprimordial constituents of Being-in-the-world.

 B.) Foundation:  If X supervenes on Y, then X is founded on Y.  For example, dreams presuppose perception which supplies its content, so dreams are said to be founded on perception, or perception is said to be founding for dreams.  The relation is hierarchical in the sense that the content of dreams depends on perception, but not vice versa.  This relation is also expressed in terms of conditions; if Y founds X, then Y is the condition for X.  In order for X and Y to stand in such a relation of dependence, the two terms must share some features, yet one of the terms must have additional features which constitute the hierarchy.  Heidegger is most concerned with relations of ontological dependence: the possibility of the mode of existence of X depends on the mode of existence of Y, in which Y contains some ontological features above and beyond X.  For example, since representations supervene on Being-in-the-world, Vorhandenheit is a founded mode of existence in this ontological sense.5  His foundational project, at least as he conceived it at the outset of Being and Time, was to provide the ultimate basis for ontology.

2.  Heidegger's Theory of Space

Heidegger distinguishes three different types of space:  1. world-space, 2. regions (Gegend), and 3. Dasein's spatiality.6  What Heidegger calls "world-space" is space conceived as an “arena” or “container” for objects.  It captures both our ordinary conception of space and theoretical space--in particular absolute space.  Chairs, desks, and buildings exist “in” space, but world-space is independent of such objects, much like absolute space “in which” things exist.  However, Heidegger thinks that such a conception of space is an abstraction from the spatializing conduct of our everyday activities.  The things which we deal with are near or far relative to us; according to Heidegger, this nearness or farness of things is how we first become familiar with that which we (later) represent to ourselves as "space."  This familiarity is what renders the understanding of space (in a "container" metaphor or in any other way) possible.  It is because we act spatially, going to places and reaching for things to use, that we can even develop a conception of abstract space at all.  What we normally think of as space--world-space--turns out not to be what space fundamentally is; world-space is, in Heidegger's terminology, space conceived as  vorhanden.  It is an objectified space founded on a more basic space-of-action.

 Since Heidegger thinks that space-of-action is the condition for world-space, he must explain the former without appealing to the latter.  Heidegger's task then is to describe the space-of-action without presupposing such world-space and the derived concept of a system of spatial coordinates.  However, this is difficult because all our usual linguistic expressions for describing spatial relations presuppose world-space.  For example, how can one talk about the "distance between you and me" without presupposing some sort of metric, i.e., without presupposing an objective access to the relation?  Our spatial notions such as "distance," "location," etc. must now be redescribed from a standpoint within the spatial relation of self (Dasein) to the things dealt with.  This problem is what motivates Heidegger to invent his own terminology and makes his discussion of space awkward.  In what follows I will try to use ordinary language whenever possible to explain his principal ideas.

The space-of-action has two aspects:  regions (space as Zuhandenheit) and Dasein's spatiality (space as Existentiale).    The sort of space we deal with in our daily activity is "functional" or zuhanden, and Heidegger's term for it is "region."  The places we work and live--the office, the park, the kitchen, etc.--all have different regions which organize our activities and contexualize “equipment.” My desk area as my work region has a computer, printer, telephone, books, etc., in their appropriate “places,” according to the spatiality of the way in which I work.  Regions differ from space viewed as a "container"; the latter notion lacks a "referential" organization with respect to our context of activities.7  Heidegger wants to claim that referential functionality is an inherent feature of space itself, and not just a "human" characteristic added to a container-like space.

 In our activity, how do we specifically stand with respect to functional space?  We are not "in" space as things are, but we do exist in some spatially salient manner.  What Heidegger is trying to capture is the difference between the nominal expression "we exist in space" and the adverbial expression "we exist spatially."  He wants to describe spatiality as a mode of our existence rather than conceiving space as an independent entity.  Heidegger identifies two features of Dasein's spatiality--"de-severance" (Ent-fernung) and "directionality" (Ausrichtung).8

 De-severance describes the way we exist as a process of spatial self-determination by “making things available” to ourselves.  In Heidegger's language, in making things available we "take in space" by "making the farness vanish" and by "bringing things close" (BT 139, 105).  We are not simply contemplative beings, but we exist through concretely acting in the world--by reaching for things and going to places.  When I walk from my desk area into the kitchen, I am not simply changing locations from point A to B in an arena-like space, but I am “taking in space” as I move, continuously making the “farness” of the kitchen “vanish,” as the shifting spatial perspectives are opened up as I go along.

 This process is also inherently "directional."  Every de-severing is aimed toward something or in a certain direction which is determined by our concern and by specific regions.  I must always face and move in a certain direction that is dictated by a specific region.  If I want to get a glass of ice tea, instead of going out into the yard, I face toward the kitchen and move in that direction, following the region of the hallway and the kitchen.  Regions determine where things belong, and our actions are coordinated in directional ways accordingly.

 De-severance, directionality, and regionality are three ways of describing the spatiality of a unified Being-in-the-world.  As aspects of Being-in-the-world, these spatial modes of being are equiprimordial.9 10  Regions "refer" to our activities, since they are established by our ways of being and our activities.  Our activities, in turn, are defined in terms of regions.  Only through the region can our de-severance and directionality be established.  Our object of concern always appears in a certain context and place, in a certain direction.  It is because things appear in a certain direction and in their places “there” that we have our “here.”  We orient ourselves and organize our activities, always within regions which must already be given to us.11

3.  The Concepts of Temporality

 Heidegger's analysis of space does not refer to temporal aspects of Being-in-the-world, even though they are presupposed.  In the second half of Being and Time he explicitly turns to the analysis of time and temporality in a discussion that is significantly more complex than the earlier account of spatiality.  Heidegger makes the following five distinctions between types of time and temporality: 1. the ordinary or "vulgar" conception of time; this is time conceived as Vorhandenheit.  2. world-time; this is time as Zuhandenheit.  Dasein's temporality is divided into three types:  3. Dasein's inauthentic (uneigentlich) temporality, 4. Dasein's authentic (eigentlich) temporality, and 5. originary temporality or “temporality as such.”  The analyses of the vorhanden and zuhanden modes of time are interesting, but it is Dasein's temporality that is relevant to our discussion, since it is this form of time that is said to be founding for space.  Unfortunately, Heidegger is not clear about which temporality plays this founding role.

 We can begin by excluding Dasein's inauthentic temporality.  This mode of time refers to our unengaged, "average" way in which we regard time.  It is the “past we forget” and the “future we expect,” all without decisiveness and resolute understanding.  Heidegger seems to consider that this mode of temporality is the temporal dimension of de-severance and directionality, since de-severance and directionality deal only with everyday actions.  As such, inauthentic temporality must itself be founded in an authentic basis of some sort.  The two remaining candidates for the foundation are Dasein's authentic temporality and originary temporality.

 Dasein's authentic temporality is the "resolute" mode of temporal existence.  Authentic temporality is realized when Dasein becomes aware of its own finite existence.12  This temporality has to do with one's grasp of his or her own life as a whole from one's own unique perspective.  Life gains meaning as one's own life-project, bounded by the sense of one's realization that he or she is not immortal.  This mode of time appears to have a  normative function within Heidegger's theory.  In the second half of BT he often refers to inauthentic or "everyday" mode of time as lacking some primordial quality which authentic temporality possesses.13

 In contrast, originary temporality is the formal structure of Dasein's temporality itself.14  In addition to its spatial Being-in-the-world, Dasein also exists essentially as "projection."  Projection is oriented toward the future, and this futural orientation regulates our concern by constantly realizing various possibilities.  Temporality is characterized formally as this dynamic structure of "a future which makes present in the process of having been" (BT 374, 326).  Heidegger calls the three moments of temporality--the future, the present, and the past--the three ecstases of temporality (BT 377, 329).  This mode of time is not normative but rather formal or neutral; as Blattner argues, the temporal features which constitute Dasein's temporality describe both inauthentic and authentic temporality.15

 There are some passages which indicate that authentic temporality is the primary manifestation of temporality, because of its essential orientation toward the future.  For instance, Heidegger states that "temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness" (BT 380, 331).  Elsewhere, he argues that "the ‘time’ which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality" (BT 377, 329).  In these formulations, authentic temporality is said to found other inauthentic modes.  According to Blattner, this is "by far the most common" interpretation of the status of authentic time (Blattner "Existential" 99).

 However, I agree with Blattner and Haar that there are far more passages where Heidegger considers originary temporality as distinct from authentic temporality, and founding for it and for Being-in-the-world as well.16  Here are some examples:
Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself.  The basic possibilities of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible temporalizations of temporality. (BT 352, 304)
Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. (BT 380, 331)17

Heidegger's conception seems to be that it is because we are fundamentally temporal--having the formal structure of ecstatico-horizonal unity--that we can project, authentically or inauthentically, our concernful dealings in the world and exist as Being-in-the-world.  It is on this account that temporality is said to found spatiality.
 Since Heidegger uses the term "temporality" rather than "authentic temporality" whenever the founding relation is discussed between space and time, I will begin the following analysis by assuming that it is originary temporality that founds Dasein's spatiality.  On this assumption two interpretations of the argument are possible, but both are unsuccessful given his phenomenological framework.

 I will then consider the possibility that it is "authentic temporality" which founds spatiality.  Two interpretations are also possible in this case, but neither will establish a founding relation successfully.  I will conclude that despite Heidegger's claim, an equiprimordial relation between time and space is most consistent with his own theoretical framework.  I will now evaluate the specific arguments in which Heidegger tries to prove that temporality founds spatiality.

4.  The Priority of Temporality Over Spatiality

 The principal argument occurs in Section 70, entitled "The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of Dasein."  Heidegger begins the section with the following remark:

 Though the expression `temporality' does not signify what one understands by "time" when one talks about `space and time', nevertheless spatiality seems to make up another basic attribute of Dasein corresponding to temporality.  Thus with Dasein's spatiality, existential-temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call "Dasein," must be considered as `temporal' `and also' as spatial coordinately. (BT 418, 367)

Accordingly, Heidegger asks, "Has our existential-temporal analysis of Dasein thus been brought to a the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein...and Being-in-the-world?" (BT 418, 367)  His answer is no.  He argues that since "Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of temporality," and since the  "spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein...belongs to Being-in-the-world," it follows that "Dasein's specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality" (BT 418-419, 367).

 Heidegger's claim is that the totality of regions-de-severance-directionality can be organized and re-organized, "because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its Being" (BT 420, 369).  Because Dasein exists futurally as "for-the-sake-of-which," it can discover regions.  Thus, Heidegger remarks: "Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space" (BT 421, 369).

 However, in order to establish that temporality founds spatiality, Heidegger would have to show that spatiality and temporality must be distinguished in such a way that temporality not only shares a content with spatiality but also has additional content as well.  In other words, they must be truly distinct and not just analytically distinguishable.  But what is the content of "the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality?"  Does it have a content above and beyond Being-in-the-world?  Nicholson poses the same question as follows:

Is it human care which accounts for the characteristic features of human temporality?  Or is it, as Heidegger says, human temporality which accounts for the characteristic features of human care, serves as their foundation? (Nicholson 214)
The first alternative, according to Nicholson, is to reduce temporality to care: "the specific attributes of the temporality of Dasein...would be in their roots not aspects of temporality but reflections of Dasein's care" (Nicholson 215).  The second alternative is to treat temporality as having some content above and beyond care: "the three-fold constitution of care stems from the three-fold constitution of temporality" (Nicholson 216, my emphasis).

Nicholson argues that the second alternative is the correct reading.18  Dasein lives in the world by making choices, but "the ekstasis of temporality lies well prior to any our study of care introduces us to a matter whose scope outreaches care: the ekstases of temporality itself" (Nicholson 224).  Accordingly, "What SZ was able to make clear is that the reign of temporal ekstasis over the choices we make accords with the place we occupy as finite beings in the world" (Nicholson 224).
 But if Nicholson's interpretation is right, what would be the content of "the ekstases of temporality itself," if not some sort of purely formal entity or condition such as Kant's "pure intuition?"  But this would imply that Heidegger has left phenomenology behind and is now engaging in establishing a  transcendental framework outside the analysis of Being-in-the-world, such that this formal structure founds Being-in-the-world.  This is inconsistent with his initial claim that Being-in-the-world is itself foundational.19

 I believe Nicholson's first alternative offers a more consistent reading.  The structure of temporality should be treated as an abstraction from Dasein's Being-in-the-world, specifically from care.20  In this case, the content of temporality just is the past and the present and the future ways of Being-in-the-world.  Heidegger's own words support this reading: "as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is too," and "the world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality" (BT 416-417, 364-367).  He also states that the zuhanden "world-time, in the rigorous sense of the existential-temporal conception of the world, belongs to temporality itself" (BT 457, 405).  In this reading, "temporality temporalizing itself," "Dasein's projection," and "the temporal projection of the world" are three different ways of describing the same "happening" of Being-in-the-world, which Heidegger calls "self-directive" (BT 420, 368).

 However, if this is the case, then temporality does not found spatiality, except perhaps in the trivial sense that spatiality is built into the notion of care which is identified with temporality.  The content of "temporality temporalizing itself" simply is the various openings of regions, i.e., Dasein's "breaking into space."21  Certainly, as Stroeker points out, it is true that "nearness and remoteness are spatio-temporal phenomena and cannot be conceived without a temporal moment" (Stroeker 30).  But this necessity does not constitute a foundation.  Rather, they are equiprimordial.  The addition of temporal dimensions does indeed complete the discussion of spatiality, which abstracted from time.  But this completion, while it better articulates the whole of Being-in-the-world, does not show that temporality is more fundamental.

 If temporality and spatiality are equiprimordial, then all of the supposedly founding relations between temporality and spatiality discussed in Section 70 could just as well be reversed and still hold true.  Heidegger's view is that "because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factically and constantly" (BT 420, 369).  But if Dasein is essentially a factical projection, then the reverse should also be true.22  Heidegger appears to have assumed the priority of temporality over spatiality perhaps under the influence of Kant, Husserl, or Dilthey, and then based his analyses on that assumption.23

 However, there may still be a way to save Heidegger's foundational project in terms of authentic temporality.  Heidegger never specifically mentions authentic temporality in Section 70, but since he suggests earlier that the primary manifestation of temporality is authentic temporality, such a reading may perhaps be justified.  This reading would treat the whole spatio-temporal structure of Being-in-the-world--as described in Section 70--as inauthentic.  The resoluteness of authentic temporality, arising out of Dasein's own "Being-towards-death," would supply a content to temporality above and beyond everyday involvements.

 Heidegger's discussion of "Situation" suggests such a reading.  "Situation" is said to have its foundations in resoluteness (BT 346, 299).24  Dasein determines its own Situation through anticipatory resoluteness, which includes particular locations and involvements, i.e., the spatiality of Being-in-the-world.  The same set of circumstances could be transformed into a new Situation with different significance, if Dasein chooses resolutely to bring that about.  Authentic temporality in this case can be said to found spatiality, since Dasein's spatiality is determined by resoluteness.  This reading moreover enables Heidegger to construct a hierarchical relation between temporality and spatiality within Being-in-the-world rather than going outside of it to a formal transcendental principle, since the choice of spatiality is grasped phenomenologically in terms of the concrete experience of decision.

 Moreover, one might argue that according to Heidegger one's own grasp of "death" is uniquely a temporal mode of existence, whereas there is no such weighty conception involving spatiality.  Death is what makes Dasein "stand before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (BT 294, 250).  Authentic Being-towards-death is a "Being towards a possibility--indeed, towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself" (BT 305, 261).  One could argue that notions such as "potentiality" and "possibility" are distinctively temporal, nonspatial notions.  So "Being-towards-death," as temporal, appears to be much more ontologically "fundamental" than spatiality.

 However, Heidegger is not yet out of the woods.  I believe that labeling the notions of anticipatory resoluteness, Being-towards-death, potentiality, and possibility specifically as  temporal modes of being (to the exclusion of spatiality) begs the question.  Given Heidegger's phenomenological framework, why assume that these notions are only temporal (without spatial dimensions)?  If Being-towards-death, potentiality-for-Being, and possibility were "purely" temporal notions, what phenomenological sense can we make of such abstract conceptions, given that these are manifestly our modes of existence as bodily beings?   Heidegger cannot have in mind such an abstract notion of time, if he wants to treat authentic temporality as the meaning of care.  It would seem more consistent with his theoretical framework to say that Being-towards-death is a rich spatio-temporal mode of being, given that Dasein is Being-in-the-world.

 Furthermore, the interpretation which defines resoluteness as  uniquely temporal suggests too much of a voluntaristic or subjectivistic notion of the self that controls its own Being-in-the-world from the standpoint of its future.  This would drive a wedge between the self and its Being-in-the-world, thereby creating a temporal "inner self" which can decide its own spatiality.25  However, if Dasein is Being-in-the-world as Heidegger claims, then all of Dasein's decisions should be viewed as concretely grounded in Being-in-the-world.  If so, spatiality must be an essential constitutive element.

 Hence, authentic temporality, if construed narrowly as the mode of temporality, at first appears to be able to found spatiality, but it also commits Heidegger either to an account of time which is too abstract, or to the notion of the self far more like Sartre's than his own.  What is lacking in Heidegger's theory that generates this sort of difficulty is a developed conception of Dasein as a lived body--a notion more fully developed by Merleau-Ponty.

 The elements of a more consistent interpretation of authentic temporality are present in Being and Time.  This interpretation incorporates a view of "authentic spatiality" in the notion of authentic temporality.26  This would be Dasein's resolutely grasping its own spatio-temporal finitude with respect to its place and its world.  Dasein is born at a particular place, lives in a particular place, dies in a particular place, all of which it can relate to in an authentic way.  The place Dasein lives is not a place of anonymous involvements.  The place of Dasein must be there where its own potentiality-for-Being is realized.  Dasein's place is thus a determination of its existence.  Had Heidegger developed such a conception more fully, he would have seen that temporality is equiprimordial with thoroughly spatial and contextual Being-in-the-world.  They are distinguishable but equally fundamental ways of emphasizing our finitude.

5.  Conclusion

 The internal tensions within his theory eventually leads Heidegger to reconsider his own positions.  In his later period, he explicitly develops what may be viewed as a conception of authentic spatiality.  For instance, in "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger states that Dasein's relations to locations and to spaces inheres in dwelling, and dwelling is the basic character of our Being (PLT 160).  The notion of dwelling expresses an affirmation of spatial finitude.27  Through this affirmation one acquires a proper relation to one's environment.

 But the idea of dwelling is in fact already discussed in Being and Time.  In Section 12, regarding the term "Being-in-the-world," Heidegger explains that the word "in" is derived from "innan"--to "reside," "habitare," "to dwell."28   The emphasis on "dwelling" highlights the essentially "worldly" character of the self.

 Thus from the beginning Heidegger had a conception of spatial finitude, but this fundamental insight was undeveloped because of his ambition to carry out the foundational project which favored time.  From the 1930's on, as Heidegger abandons the foundational project focusing on temporality, the conception of authentic spatiality comes to the fore.  For example, in Discourse on Thinking Heidegger considers the spatial character of Being as "that-which-regions (die Gegnet)" (Sefler 249).  The peculiar expression is a re-conceptualization of the notion of "region" as it appeared in Being and Time.  Region is given an active character and defined as the "openness that surrounds us" which "comes to meet us" (DT 65-66).  By giving it an active character, Heidegger wants to emphasize that region is not brought into being by us, but rather exists in its own right, as that which expresses our spatial existence.  Heidegger states that "one needs to understand ‘resolve’ (Entschlossenheit) as it is understood in Being and Time: as the opening of man [Dasein] particularly undertaken by him for openness,...which we think of as that-which-regions" (DT 81).  Here Heidegger is asserting an authentic conception of spatiality.  The finitude expressed in the notion of Being-in-the-world is thus transformed into an authentic recognition of our finite worldly existence in later writings.

 The return to the conception of spatial finitude in the later period shows that Heidegger never abandoned the original insight behind his conception of Being-in-the-world.  But once committed to this idea, it is hard to justify singling out an aspect of the self--temporality--as the foundation for the rest of the structure.  All of the existentiale and zuhanden modes, which constitute the whole of Being-in-the-world, are equiprimordial, each mode articulating different aspects of a unified whole.  The preference for temporality as the privileged meaning of existence reflects the Kantian residue in Heidegger's early doctrine which he later rejected as still excessively subjectivistic.
 Many people have commented on the earlier versions of this paper.  I would like to thank Steven Crowell, Andrew Feenberg, Piet Hut, Nobuo Kazashi, Pierre Keller, Ryosuke Ohashi, Frederick Olafson, and Mark Ravizza for their comments.


1.  Graeme Nicholson calls this move the "pivotal turn of the entire book"--to question "whether it is possible to interpret the structure of care any further" (Nicholson 212).
2.  Heidegger uses several terms to describe the notion of "foundational" or "fundamental."  (Grund or grunden, fundieren, Fundament, or fundamentieren.)  The sense in which I use the term, as Dreyfus and Hall explains, is that the project tries to supply an "ungrounded ground" for ontology (Dreyfus and Hall 3).  It is to find "the condition under which" ontology is possible.  In this sense, his project might be conceived as having a transcendental framework.
3.  Although Heidegger himself claims that section 70 in BT was to show how spatiality was derived from temporality, the arguments in section 70 does not address such a derivation.  The concern in that section is whether temporality founds spatiality, in the sense that temporality is the basis for having spatiality.
4.  In his recent article, Robert Frodeman also argues that space-time relation is equiprimordial (Frodeman 34).  While I try to establish this point by a critique of the claim that time founds space, Frodeman shows that we can reconstruct the notion of care in BT as expressing authentic spatiality as well as temporality.
5.  Heidegger's original ambition at the outset of Being and Time was to systematize various modes of being and ultimately to provide the most fundamental ontological foundation.  To find such a foundation, we must abandon our traditional ontological presuppositions and start our investigation phenomenologically by analyzing our everyday modes of existence.  He called this project "fundamental ontology" (BT 34, 13:  The page numbers in Being and Time will appear italicized, and the German pagination will follow unitalicized).
6.  A brief discussion of world-space occurs in BT 79, 54.  The discussion of spatiality (regions and Dasein's spatiality) occurs in Division One, III, sections 22-24 (BT 134-148, 101-113).  The secondary sources on the discussion of spatiality is scarce. The neglect seems to be due to Heidegger's own perception of the lesser importance of space in comparison to time, which most of the commentators also assumed.  The lack of development of the theory of space in Heidegger was first noted in 1928 by a Japanese philosopher Tetsuro Watsuji.  Inspired by Heidegger, Watsuji developed his own theory of milieu as the socio-historical theory of space (Watsuji v.).  For recent discussions on Heidegger’s notion of space, see Dreyfus, Being in the World, Chapter 7, Frodeman, and Franck.
7.  This is to say that regions are essentially indexical.  The indexical "here" does not pick a point A of the subject in a neutral, container-like space, but rather, our spatial activities determine a "here" with respect to the things we deal with and the way we move.  Regions are inherently organized by activities which determine the center of action.
8.  In HCT, de-severance (remotion) and directionality (orientation) are discussed also as the features of the structure of the "aroundness of the world" (cf. HCT 225-227).  In Being and Time, these modes of spatiality belong to Dasein.  But since Being-in-the-world is a unity, this shift should be considered as a shift in emphasis.
9.  This equiprimordial unity is more explicitly stated in HCT; remotion [de-severance], region, and orientation [directionality] are the "three interconnected phenomena" which define the structure of the aroundness of the world as well as the spatiality of Dasein.  These spatial phenomena are the three aspects of Being-in-the-world (cf. Section 25).
10.  Dreyfus attributes a founding relation between regions (his term for it is "public space") and Dasein's spatiality.  According to Dreyfus, de-severance (his term for it is "dis-stance") enables Dasein to encounter things as near or far, and thereby opens up a shared, public space (Dreyfus 130-131).  Dreyfus claims that Heidegger's theory of space is "fundamentally confused" because Heidegger does not clearly distinguish "public space" and the "centered spatiality of individual human being" (Dreyfus 129).  Elsewhere I argue that Dreyfus' public/individual distinction does not correspond to Heidegger's region/de-severance distinction.  For my critique of Dreyfus see Arisaka.
11.  Heidegger expresses this interdependence in several ways:  "If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and desevering, its own discovered region" (BT 143, 108), "every bringing-close has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close" (BT 143, 108), or "the essential directionality of essentially co-determined by Being-in-the-world" (BT 144, 110).
To free a totality of involvements is, equiprimordially, to let something be involved at a region, and to do so by de-severing and giving directionality; this amounts to freeing the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand.  In that significance with which Dasein (as concernful Being-in) is familiar, lies the essential co-disclosedness of space. (BT 145, 110)
12.  The affinity of this idea to Nietzsche's idea of Ubermensch has been noted.  For example, Jacques Taminiaux writes:  "The free acceptance of finite existence is...the first point of convergence between the Heideggerian analysis and the teaching of Zarathustra.  In both cases, such an acceptance entails the contrast between ownmost individuation and a neutralized, anonymous and weak mode of being, i.e., the mode of being of everydayness (in Heidegger's terminology) and of the superfluous (in Nietzsche's)" (Taminiaux 181).
13.  In the first half of BT the inauthentic/authentic distinction does not seem to suggest a normative claim in favor of authenticity.  Inauthenticity appears to be just as integral aspect of our existence as authenticity.  However, in the second half, Heidegger increasingly relegates inauthenticity to a "lesser" mode of existence, since authenticity is realized through Dasein's recognition of the "whole" of its existence and inauthenticity would be a lack of such a recognition.
14.  Heidegger's motivation to abstract a structure of temporality as such seems to come from his initial ambition in Being and Time to ultimately found the meaning of Being as such, a project which he calls "fundamental ontology."  The project cannot stop at describing the temporal/ontological modes of Dasein, but it must in the end supply the foundation of ontology itself, as a science of Being.  Being and Time does not complete this project, but he continues his attempts in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.  In this book, Heidegger explicitly distinguishes Dasein's temporality (Zeitlichkeit) and temporality as such as the foundation for the meaning of Being itself (Temporalitaet).  The term Temporalitaet does not appear in the main discussion of temporality in Being and Time (it appears in the Introduction where Heidegger explains the final goal of fundamental ontology), but the abstraction of temporality as such seems to anticipate the later distinction.
15.  According to Blattner, "originary temporality [is] indifferent between authentic and inauthentic modes of human existence" (Blattner "Existential" 100).
16.  According to Blattner, "authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality" and that originary temporality itself is "not authentic" (Blattner "Existential" 101).  Haar states: "The originary neutral with respect to the authentic and inauthentic" (Haar 34).
17.  For the purpose of this paper, I will treat the term "care" or the "care-structure" as another term for Being-in-the-world.
18.  Nicholson states: "Everyday modes of care vary in their intentions and goals, but no intention or goal can alter the circumstance that possibility moves in upon us and thereby gives us a past and a present" (Nicholson 221).  He sees, therefore, an asymmetrical relation between temporality itself and the particular moments of care.  The existence of the moments of care supervene on the structure of temporality as such (of future-made-present).  Thus Nicholson states that "the particulars of Dasein's posture in the world do not have the power to create or to alter the overarching unity and structure of temporality" (Nicholson 221).
19.  Guignon identifies this problem as follows: "there is a tension in Being and Time between Heidegger's explicit aim of finding transcendental, essential structures that will serve as a foundation for ontology in the widest sense, and the concrete results of the existential analytic which lead us to see that such findings will always be culturally and historically conditioned" (Guignon 63, 207).  Guignon calls this tension between the "ahistorical and transcendental" standpoint and the historical, contextualized Being-in-the-world "the problem of reflexivity" (cf. Guignon chapter V).  The dilemma Guignon sees concerning fundamental ontology is,
Either it is true that cultural and historical factors determine our sense of what it is to be, in which case the results of Being and Time must themselves be seen as cultural and historical products.  Or it is false, in which case the concrete conclusions of the work concerning Dasein are undermined, and Heidegger loses a large part of his grounds for criticizing the Cartesian model. (Guignon 208).
20.  As Steven Crowell points out, for Heidegger (as is for Husserl) the phenomenological sense of "transcendental" is "a field of evidence embedded within mundanity rather than a formal construction of principles deduced to explain mundanity" (Crowell 509).  In this sense, the structure of temporality as such would articulate the structure of the temporality of Dasein without going outside of the phenomenological domain.  If so, Heidegger should have made clearer that the sense in which temporality is “founding” is not so much in the Kantian sense as his language largely suggests but rather in the Husserlian sense of  “clarifying the field of evidence” which constitutes the meaning of the being of care.  If this is the case, however, it is hard to see in what sense temporality must be more basic than spatiality.
21.  In Stroeker's words, "in the nearness and remoteness of attuned space, spatial and temporal determinations are mutually pervasive" (Stroeker 43).
22.  When we think of certain past or future events, we do so always in terms of particular places.  We can only project in terms of places; without spatial determinations, possibilities do not have content.
23.  Several commentators discuss the origins of his assumption of the priority of time over space.  Sherover traces it ultimately to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, specifically to the claim that while space is the form of outer appearances only, time is the form of all appearances whatsoever (Kant A34, B51).  Sherover comments that "Heidegger has found the essential characterization of human be rooted in the Kantian thesis which identified time as inner sense" (Sherover Heidegger 220).  Guignon, Blattner, and Poeggeler stress the importance of the influence of Dilthey's conception of "life" as a temporal unity (cf. Guignon, 49, 61; Blattner, 149).  One cannot overlook the influence of Husserl's formulations of the constitution of the inner time-consciousness:  As N. O. Bernsen points out, Heidegger's theory of temporality is "an attempt at a radical further development of Husserl's philosophy of time" (Bernsen 205).  John Caputo asserts that Heidegger's ontology of temporality is "largely inherited from Kierkegaard" (Caputo 121).   Heidegger is probably influenced by all of these thinkers.  The point to note is the unchallenged assumption of the priority of time over space.
24.  "Situation" is only authentic: Heidegger further states that "for the `they', however, the Situation is essentially closed off.  The `they' knows only the `general situation', loses itself in those `opportunities' which are closest to it..." (BT 346, 299).
25.  Marion Heinz offers such an interpretation:  "For temporality an `inner productivity' is characteristic..." (Heinz 195).
26.  Cf. Frodeman's discussion of care as "authentic spatiality" (Frodeman 37).
27.  I would like to thank Augustin Berque for pointing out the significance of the notion of "dwelling" within Heidegger's theory of space.
28.  He elaborates further that the entity to which the signification "Being-in" belongs is Dasein, which has the character of and is in each case "I myself am [bin]":  "The expression `bin' is connected with `bei', and so `ich bin' [`I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "I dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way" (BT 80, 54).

 Works Cited

Arisaka, Yoko.  “On Heidegger’s Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus.”  Inquiry. Vol. 38, no.4.   December 1995.

Bernsen, Niels Ole.  Heidegger's Theory of Intentionality.  Hanne Vohts, trans. Odense University  Press, Odense, Denmark: 1986.

Blattner, William.  Temporal Synthesis and Temporality in Kant and Heidegger.  Diss. University of  Pittsburgh, 1989. Ann Arbor, UMI, 8921336.

---.  "Existential Temporality in Being and Time." Heidegger: A Critical Reader.  Dreyfus and Hall,  eds. Blackwell, Cambridge: 1992. pp. 99-129.

Caputo, John.  "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a Hermeneutic' Phenomenology."  A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time."  J. Kockelmans, ed. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, Washington D.C.: 1986.  pp. 104-126.

Crowell, Steven Galt.  "Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the  Encyclopaedia Britannica Article."  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. L, no. 3,  March 1990.  pp. 501-518.

Dreyfus, Hubert.  Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I.   MIT Press, Cambridge: 1991.

Dreyfus, H. and H. Hall, eds.  Heidegger: A Critical Reader.   Blackwell, Cambridge: 1992.

Franck, Didier.  Heidegger et le problème de l’espace.  Les Editions de Minuit.  Paris: 1986.

Frodeman, Robert.  "Being and Space: A Re-Reading of Existential Spatiality in Being and Time.  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.  Vol. 23, no. 1. Ja 1992.  pp. 33-41.

Guignon, Charles.  Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge.  Hackett Publishing Co, Indianapolis:  1983.

Haar, Michel.  Heidegger and the Essence of Man.  W. McNeill, trans.  SUNY Press, Albany: 1993.

Heidegger, Martin.  Being and Time. [BT]  E. Robinson and J. Macquarrie, trans.  Harper, New York:  1962.

---.  Discourse on Thinking. [DT] J. Anderson and E. Freund,  Harper, New York: 1966.

---.  History of the Concept of Time. [HCT]  T. Kisiel, trans.  Indiana University Press, Bloomington:  1985.

---.  Poetry, Language, Thought. [PLT] A. Hofstadter, trans.  Harper, New York: 1971.

---.  Sein und Zeit.  Max Niemeyer Verlag Tuebingen 1967.

---.  The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. [BPP]  A. Hofstadter, trans. Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1988.

Heinz, Marion.  "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works."  A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time."  J. Kockelmans, ed. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, Washington D.C.: 1986. pp. 183-207.

Kant, Immanuel.  Critique of Pure Reason.  N. Kemp Smith, trans.  St. Martin's Press, New York: 1965.

Nicholson, Graeme.  "Ekstatic Temporality in Sein und Zeit."  A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time."  J. Kockelmans, ed. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, Washington D.C.: 1986. pp. 208-226.

Olafson, Frederick.  Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind.  Yale University Press, New Haven: 1987.

Sefler, George.  "Heidegger's Philosophy of Space." Philosophy Today. vol. 17, 1973.  pp.246-254.

Sherover, Charles.  Heidegger, Kant, and Time.  Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1971.

Stroeker, Elisabeth.  Investigations in Philosophy of Space.  A. Mickunas, trans.  Ohio University Press, Athens: 1987.

Tamimiaux, Jacques.  Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology.  M. Gendre, trans.   SUNY Press, New York: 1991.

Watsuji, Tetsuro.  Fudo [Milieu].  Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo: 1935.

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